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AMERICA'S ENERGY POLICY: BUDGET
BARGAIN OR CLOSE-OUT SALE?
Efforts to harness energy represent one of man's most relentless
pursuits. As technology advances, society becomes increasingly depen-
dent on services generated by energy. Advantages and disadvantages
stem from this increased dependence. When we use our resources effi-
ciently, energy development provides exceptional strength, but when
we fail to acknowledge significant environmental and economic factors,
energy demands stifle our economy and abruptly alter our lifestyle.
The following analysis begins with an overview of important events
concerning energy during the past decade. This background provides a
valuable context for understanding and analyzing energy fiscal policies.
AN ENERGY TAPESTRY
During the 1950's and 1960's, the United States benefitted from in-
expensive, readily accessible, and seemingly inexhaustible energy re-
sources.I By 1970, America's abundant energy supplies began to
diminish, and all experts' now agree that the United State's domestic
oil production will never surpass the peak reached in 1970.1 While do-
mestic oil production declined, America's dependence on foreign oil
increased. This rising dependence linked the United States to econom-
ically and politically volatile countries.4
On October 18, 1973 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) imposed its first oil embargo.' This embargo qua-
drupled crude-oil prices and fueled inflation in the United States. The
Federal government responded to this crisis through diverse legislative
and executive efforts. In early November 1973, President Nixon pro-
posed "Project Independence, ' ' 6 the first major executive energy initia-
tive in the 1970's. A week later, Congress authorized a fuel allocation
and price control system,7 and the construction of the Alaskan pipe-
line.8 In December, Congress instituted year-round daylight savings
time9 and lowered the maximum speed limit on the nation's highways
1. IV CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESS AND THE NATION (1973-1976) 201 (1976). En-
ergy was a bargain for the post-World War II era until the early 1970's.
2. Denis Hayes, Director of Solar Energy Research Institute, statement made at the University
of Notre Dame Law School, November 19, 1982.
3. D. HAYES, RAYS OF HOPE 9 (1977).
4. V CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESS AND THE NATION (1977-1980) 451 (1980).
America depended on potentially unstable sources and the burden of uncertain supplies
posed significant concern.
5. Supra note 1.
6. Id. at 207.
7. Id. at 210.
8. Id. at 208.
9. Id. at 211.
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to fifty-five miles per hour.'
On January 23, 1974, President Nixon declared energy policy devel-
opment to be the Federal, state, and local governments' most critical
legislative task." OPEC's decision to cease its oil embargo in March
1974 mitigated the urgency for energy legislation. Yet, President
Nixon continued to strive for energy security. By the close of 1974,
Congress had enacted two-thirds of President Nixon's threefold Fed-
eral energy structure. 2 Despite this achievement, President Nixon
failed to convince Congress to enact his most significant reorganiza-
tional proposal - the creation of a Department of Energy and Natural
Resources. 13
Though oil supplies gradually returned to the pre-embargo level,
the cost for imported oil increased dramatically14 and the resultant im-
balance of payments contributed to worsening economic conditions in
the United States. Consequently, the need for long-term, cohesive en-
ergy policies became increasingly apparent. President Ford demon-
strated his support for the creation of a national energy policy on
January 31, 1975 by sending Congress a thirteen part proposal 15 that he
hoped would become the basis for a national energy policy.
President Ford's energy proposal, particularly his conservation
plan, stirred considerable debate.'6 President Ford wanted to promote
conservation by increasing energy prices through two methods: first,
by placing an additional three dollar fee on every barrel of imported
oil;' 7 and second, by lifting the federal controls which held the price of
domestic oil below its real market value. 8 President Ford recom-
mended phasing in the fee on foreign oil through one dollar increments
over three months.' 9 After considerable discussion, President Ford ex-
tended the price increase timetable and postponed his plan to deregu-
late domestic oil.2" In return, he hoped Congress would formulate a
comprehensive energy plan. Congressional efforts produced a bill enti-
tled "Energy Policy and Conservation Act"'2 and President Ford
signed it on December 22, 1975. He was not completely satisfied with
the bill, but he believed it would provide a foundation upon which
10. Id.
II. Id. at 218. President Nixon stated in his 1974 energy message to Congress on Jan. 23, 1974:
"No single legislative area is more critical or more challenging to us as a people."
12. Id. at 217. In May, President Nixon signed a measure which created the Federal Energy
Administration (FEA). In October, President Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration (ERDA).
13. Id.
14. D. HAYES, supra note 3, at 15.
15. Supra note 1, at 234.
16. Id. at 235.
17. Id. at 234.
18. Id. at 235.
19. Id. at 234.
20. Id. at 235.
21. Id. at 235, 237.
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Congress could eventually construct a more comprehensive national
energy program.
By 1976, the once highly publicized energy problem no longer cap-
tured the nation's attention. Despite declining public concern, Presi-
dent Ford realized that energy questions posed long term problems and
on February 26, 1976, he asked Congress to act on sixteen proposals
ranging from deregulating the price of new natural gas to providing a
fifteen percent tax credit for energy conservation improvements.2 2 By
the close of 1976, however, Congress had only enacted four of the
proposals.23
In January 1977, President Jimmy Carter took office and almost
immediately the pressures of the on-going energy crisis became appar-
ent.24 Like Presidents Nixon and Ford, President Carter realized that
continued dependence on imported energy supplies undermined na-
tional security and hindered the United States' economy. Conse-
quently, President Carter made energy policy a fudamental domestic
concern25 and the Democratic congressional leaders made passage of a
national energy policy their top legislative priority for 1977.26 Presi-
dent Carter's most ambitious energy policy proposal in 1977 was his
recommendation that Congress create a new Cabinet-level Department
of Energy.27 President Carter agreed with Presidents Nixon and Ford
that centralizing energy policy efforts would enable the Federal govern-
ment to confront energy problems in a comprehensive way. President
Carter's proposal became a reality on August 4, 1977.28
In 1978, Congress dedicated substantial efforts toward drafting a
national energy policy based on President Carter's plan originally
presented in April 1977; however, President Carter's proposal encoun-
tered opposition similiar to the rebuttal that President Ford's higher
energy price proposal received.2 9 Democratic leaders argued that in-
creased energy costs would spur inflation, depress America's flagging
economy, and cause more unemployment. 30 Following months of de-
bate, Congress presented President Carter with a five-part energy pack-
age on October 15, 1978. 3 t The package lacked many of the tough
22. Id. at 258.
23. Id. at 258. The 94th Congress enacted Ford's requests concerning Alaskan natural gas, the
naval petroleum reserves, weatherization assistance and thermal building standards, but the
other 12 requests either failed to win final approval or had been ignored by Congress
altogether.
24. Supra note 4, at 451. American suffered from a natural gas shortage, and decreasing domes-
tic oil production forced the United States to purchase a record 46% of its oil from foreign
sources in 1976.
25. Id. at 457.
26. Id. at 457.
27. Id. at 460. President Carter proposed the creation of a Department of Energy in his March
1, 1976 message to Congress. He stated, "Nowhere is the need for reorganization and ocn-
solidation greater than in energy policy."
28. Id. at 459.
29. ld. at 468.
30. Id. at 469.
31. Id. at 468.
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features that President Carter requested, however, he believed that it at
least declared America's intent to control its energy use.
In 1979, President Carter presented Congress with an additional en-
ergy policy plan that contained three fundamental features:32
1. a windfall profits tax on oil company revenues;
2. a massive Federal push to develop a synthetic fuels industry;
3. the creation of an Energy Mobilization Board to streamline high-
priority energy projects.
He announced the windfall profits tax in April and scheduled a major
televised address for July 5 to announce the synthetic fuels industry
and Energy Mobilization Board proposals.33 But by the end of June,
waiting lines at gasoline pumps in many cities evidenced America's
continuing energy problems. 34 Acknowledging these frustrations, Pres-
ident Carter rescheduled the July energy address and held a "domestic
summit" at Camp David where he conferred with Americans from
multiple and diverse backgrounds. 35 On July 15, President Carter
emerged from Camp David, announced his synthetic fuels and energy
mobilization proposals, and described the United States as suffering
from "a crisis of confidence. '3 6 He declared that by marshaling the
energy crisis, the nation could generate "a rebirth of the American
spirit,' ' 37 that would supply solutions to complex economic troubles
and social disparities.
By the close of 1979 all three measures were still in conference, but
two major events sparked public awareness of energy issues. The first
occurred on March 28, 1979, when the Three Mile Island nuclear
power plant unleashed the worst nuclear reactor accident in the history
of nuclear power in the United States. 38 And the second occurred in
November when Iran erupted into revolution and rebels captured
United States embassy personnel, ostensibly because the United States
had supported the former Shah to insure Middle East oil supplies.39
These events highlighted the interrelated implications of energy issues.
In 1980 Congress thwarted three of President Carter's key energy
proposals. First, Congress rejected the section within the windfall
profit tax proposal that recommended placing the revenues generated
by the tax into an energy security trust fund. This fund would then be
used to develop mass transit and synthetic fuels, and to help low in-
come people pay their fuel bills.4" Second, Congress dismissed Presi-
dent Carter's energy mobilization board proposal.4 ' And third, the
32. Id. at 493.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 500.
39. Id. at Ill.
40. Id. at 506.
41. Id. at 503.
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House thwarted an Administration plan to provide grants to state and
local governments for energy planning and conservation. 42
The inauguration of Ronald Reagan as President of the United
States was the most significant event affecting national energy policy in
1981. President Reagan's approach to energy policy differs from his
three predecessors in two important ways. First, he has attempted to
deemphasize the government's role in energy development.43 Second,
President Reagan has requested drastic decreases in government fund-
ing for all non-nuclear energy programs.' The implications of these
cuts can be seen by tracing the impact of the fiscal year 1980 and 1981
budgets from the federal level to the state and local levels in Indiana.
Several factors influence the State of Indiana's energy policy. First,
Indiana does possess abundant reserves of coal and oil shale, but has
only minimal proven reserves of oil and natural gas.45 Second, because
Indiana lacks oil and natural gas and heavily consumes these resources,
the State is a net energy importer. Lastly, the State's reliance on exter-
nal energy resources creates a negative economic impact on the State.
Energy policy, both State and Federal, directly affects Indiana's econ-
omy and its potential for growth.
Indiana's potential for economic growth is closely linked to the de-
velopment of its energy reserves. Indiana's coal reserves, which are the
State's most abundant energy resource, are estimated at eleven billion
tons.46 Despite these enormous reserves, the State imports more coal
than it produces. In 1980, Indiana produced 28,768,000 tons of coal
and consumed 45,525,000 tons. 47 Coal does not constitute a more sig-
nificant factor in Indiana's energy scheme for several reasons. First,
Indiana's coal contains a high degree of sulfur, and therefore, it cannot
be burned without air pollution control devices. Many coal consumers
find it more economical to import and bum low-sulfur coal than to
install the pollution control devices required for burning high-sulfur
coal.48 Second, coal cannot yet be converted economically to liquid or
gaseous fuels due to market failures, regulatory obstacles, and unavail-
able technologies. Finally, the steel industry cannot use Indiana coal to
make coke; therefore, Indiana's steel industry must import coal for its
coking process.49
Indiana faces similar problems with its greatest energy resoure, oil
42. Id. at 530.
43. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SECURING AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE: THE NATIONAL ENERGY
POLICY PLAN 1 (1981):
Increased reliance on market decisions offers a continuing national referendum which
is a far better means of charting the Nation's energy path than stubborn reliance on
government dictates or on a combination of subsidies and regulations.
44. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FISCAL YEAR 1982 BUDGET IN BRIEF (1981).
45. M. LARASON AND K. REAMS, INDIANA ENERGY POLICY 8 (1982) (draft paper) [hereinafter
cited as LARASON].
46. Id.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id.
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shale." The State's estimated oil shale resources, designated as the
New Albany type, total nearly forty billion barrels .5  However, oil
shale has not yet contributed to the state's energy needs, because cost-
effective technologies have not been developed to refine this resource.
Indiana has only minimal proven reserves of oil and natural gas,
and depends heavily on external producers for these traditional fossil
fuels. In 1980, Indiana's seven refineries produced approximately three
percent of the State's annual oil consumption. Indiana's five hundred
natural gas wells provided less than one percent of the State's annual
natural gas consumption.5 2
As fossil fuels become even more costly, Indiana may turn to other
energy sources to meet its needs. Seven active hydroelectric generating
stations are located in the State, supplying an estimated 377 million
kilowatt hours of electricity a year. Indiana does not have any active
nuclear power plants, but it does receive interstate transfers of electric-
ity, totalling early 4,786 million kilowatt hours a year, from nuclear
power plants in adjoining states.53 Hydroelectric and nuclear power
meet only a small portion of the state's total energy needs.
By considering the recent trends in Indiana's energy production and
consumption, one gains an enriched understanding of Indiana's energy
picture. Since 1960 both the consumption and production of coal have
increased. Indiana's consumption of natural gas has increased by
nearly 140% since 1960 while its output has declined. Additionally the
state's fossil fuel consumption increased by seventy-one percent while
it's production increased by only forty-two percent. These production
and consumption trends forced Indiana to become a net energy
importer.5 4
Assigning a monetary value to these production and consumption
figures demonstrates the economic impact of Indiana's position as a net
energy importer. In 1960, the state's energy deficit totalled $372.7 mil-
lion in nominal dollars. The deficit grew to $4,673.2 million in 1979,
and by 1980, to $6,896.4 million. Since 1974, the amount of the defi-
cit has increased by at least $400 million a year.5 6
These figures demonstrate that significant amounts of money are
flowing out of Indiana to pay energy bills. Computing Indiana's net
energy deficit as a percentage of the estimated Gross State Product
(GSP) further illustrates the negative economic impact of Indiana's po-
sition as a net energy importer. In 1960, Indiana's energy trade deficit
comprised 2.86% of the GSP. During 1964 and 1965, it declined to a
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 8. INDIANA ASSOCIATION OF CITIES AND TowNs, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN MUNICIPAL
OPERATIONS 14 (1982).
53. Id at 15.
54. DIVISION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, INDIANA'S ENERGY TRADE BALANCE: 1960-1979 (1982).
55. Id. LARASON supra note 45, at 10.
56. INDIANA'S ENERGY TRADE BALANCE, supra note 54.
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low of 2.58%, but by 1979 the trade deficit had climbed to 8.20% of the
GSP.57
The energy trade deficit has several negative effects on Indiana's
economy.58 First, the net capital outflow of Indiana dollars for energy
costs depletes investment capital and may hinder the expansion of busi-
ness and the creation of new industry. Second, the State's dependence
on energy imports renders it susceptible to supply interruptions which
makes Indiana less appealing to new businesses. Third, Indiana's reli-
ance on out-of-state energy subjects the State to cartel-induced price
changes. Finally, as energy expenditures consume an increasing por-
tion of the Indiana budget, funds become limited. At some point, the
State's energy expenses for heating government buildings and fueling
government cars force the government to use funds from other state
programs. Consequently, Indiana's net energy trade deficit directly af-
fects the State's economic and social health.59
The Division of Energy Policy within the Indiana Department of
Commerce formulates Indiana's energy policy. The Division is divided
into two sections: the state-funded Resource Development Division,
designed to promote the increased use of Indiana's energy resources,
and the federally-funded Conservation Division, designed to monitor
energy conservation programs and techniques.
Conservation and resource development constitute the key compo-
nents of Indiana's energy strategy. The Division of Energy Policy's pri-
mary objective is to reduce the use of energy produced outside the state
by developing these two areas. This strategy unfolds in a tripartite
fashion. First, increased energy conservation can slow the demand for
energy imports. Second, increased production and export sales of Indi-
ana's indigenous energy resources can diminish the state's negative bal-
ance of payments for energy. The Division endorses innovative
research and development projects that will encourage the production
and use of Indiana oil shale and coal. Third, substituting Indiana's
fossil fuels and renewable energy technologies for imported energy can
reduce the State's demand for external energy. The Division is com-
mitted to the full and efficient use of renewable resource technologies
in Indiana.
At the local level, the South Bend ethanol plant has been selected
for study for three reasons. First, the plant is financed by a unique
mixture of Federal funds, local money, and private investment. This
combination may become more prevalent as greater budget cuts occur.
Second, the construction of the plant demonstrates how the develop-
ment of alternative energy technologies can benefit both the state and
local communities. Third, at various planning stages, the ethanol plant
57. Id. at Table 3.
58. LARASON, supra note 45, at 1.
59. Id. at 5.
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was threatened with cuts in government funding. A loss of Federal
funding would have stopped the plant's development.
At each level of government, escalating energy prices have been sig-
nificant. Economic dislocation, social disruption, and unemployment
have all been attributed, in part, to increased energy costs. Energy
prices play an important role in the social and economic development
of the nation.
Over the past decade, energy costs consumed an increasing percent-
age of the nation's overall spending. In 1970, the United States paid
$83 billion for energy and by 1980, that figure soared to $378 billion.
During that decade energy consumption increased by only 14% while
energy costs rose 132%. In addition, over that period personal income
grew by 37% while the inflation rate was 94%.6 0 The Department of
Energy (DOE) estimated that the Gross National Product (GNP) de-
creased by $60 billion in 1979 and $95 billion in 1980. DOE hypothe-
sized that if the 1973-74 energy price increases had not occurred, the
loss in the growth rate of the 1980 GNP might have been totally
avoided.61 Under this scenario, the 1973-74 recession would still have
occurred, but its impact would have been diminished and in 1975, the
GNP would have surged above its actual levels. This surge would have
continued through 1980 and would have prevented any growth rate
loss in the 1980 real GNP.
The impact of escalating energy costs manifests itself in other ways
as well. First, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increases an average of
1.9 to 2.5% when energy prices rise.62 Second, a decline in energy costs
may reduce the inflation rate. For example, the overall 1981 inflation
rate decreased because of lower inflation rates for energy and food.
Finally, high energy costs negatively affect the business sector. DOE
estimates that 900,000 to 2.1 million jobs were lost from 1973 to 1980
because of rising energy costs. DOE further asserts that high energy
costs caused labor productivity to decline by approximately .4 percent,
and energy prices have reduced investment in plant and equipment.
DOE estimates that investment in fixed plant and equipment by 1980
fell about 12% below where it would have been without the energy
price increases.63 High energy prices have forced the business sector to
limit its investment in new plant and equipment and to underutilize its
existing plant and equipment.
High energy prices have varying negative impacts on regional econ-
omies. State energy prices differ depending on distance from the en-
ergy source, type of available supply, and state or local taxes. In the
residential sector, average 1978 state prices varied by 159%. In the
60. D. DEVAUL, NATIONAL AND STATE ENERGY EXPENDITURE 1970-1980 2 (1981).
61. OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND ANALYSIS, INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ENERGY AND THE
ECONOMY (1981).
62. D. DEVAUL, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF NATIONAL, STATE AND LOCAL ENERGY PRICE IN-
CREASES 7 (1982).
63. OFFICE OF POLICY, supra note 61, at 22.
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commercial sector prices differed by 110%; and in the industrial sector
prices differed by 184%.64 These variances produce several results.
First, in regions with high residential heating and cooling costs, es-
calating energy prices reduce household disposable income and cause a
shift in consumer spending. As more income is spent on energy costs,
less income is available for other consumer goods and services. This
diminished demand drains the economy of employment
opportunities.65
Second, high heating and cooling costs also affect the commercial
sector. Hospitals, schools, and government buildings located in regions
with high energy costs must increase the cost of their services or accept
a decrease in profits as energy bills become a larger share of their oper-
ating expenses. This conclusion has particular significance for local
governments. In a survey conducted by the International City Man-
agement Association, approximately fifty percent of the responding cit-
ies stated that energy expenditures are their second highest budget line
item.66 Local governments are now confronted with raising additional
revenue, cutting back on services, or implementing conservation meas-
ures in order to meet these bills.
Third, rising energy costs affect regional employment and produc-
tivity. Energy price increases cause a reduction in the output of energy
dependent regions.67 Studies have also shown that per capita income
grows faster in fuel producing states than in other parts of the coun-
try.68 As a result, employment growth has shifted from energy-poor to
energy-rich regions.
Finally, transportation energy costs are consuming a greater per-
centage of every family's personal income. In fact, in 1979 the trans-
portation budget for urban families rose faster than any other budget
category.69 Transportation energy costs will become a particularly dif-
ficult problem for people living in rural regions.
The overall effect of the regional variances in energy prices has
been a shifting of money from energy consuming to energy producing
states. The Midwest's heavy energy dependence and its large manufac-
turing base make it particularly sensitive to higher energy prices. In
late 1981 real personal income rose across the country, but fell in the
Midwest. In March of 1982, housing sales dropped twenty-eight per-
cent and auto sales dropped nineteen percent. Sales of durable goods
in late 1981 declined 5.4% in the Midwest while only .5% outside the
region.70
Higher energy costs create inequities both among regions and
64. D. DEVAUL, supra note 62, at 1-2.
65. Id. at 20.
66. INDIANA ASSOCIATION OF CITIES AND TowNs, supra note 52, at 7.
67. D. DEVAUL, supra note 62, at 29.
68. Id. at 30.
69. Id. at 34.
70. Id. at 33.
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among social classes. The decreases in the GNP, increases in the CPI,
lost employment opportunities, and diminished disposable household
income translate into real dollars and cents for the consumer. When
that consumer is a low-income family, the impacts of higher energy
costs can be particularly devastating. In 1980, families at the poverty
level spent 32.4% of their disposable income on energy, compared to an
average of 10.8%for non-poverty households.7 The impact of energy
costs on low and fixed income households is overpowering considering
that these expenditures generally occur over the short winter months.
Low income families are least able to afford conservation measures so
they have fewer ways to reduce their energy bills.
The social and economic implications of rising energy costs cannot
be ignored. The economic impacts of higher energy prices are signifi-
cant, cumulative, and long-lasting. Any national, state, or local energy
plan should strive to diminish the negative economic and social conse-
quences of rising energy prices. To place these broad implications in
context, this paper focuses on the impact of rising energy costs on the
state of Indiana.
CONSERVATION
Conservation programs are designed to reduce growth in energy de-
mand by encouraging the efficient and economical use of energy. For
Fiscal Year 1981, President Carter proposed $1,067 billion for federal
energy conservation programs. This request represented an increase of
$24 million over Fiscal Year 1980.72 The actual appropriations for en-
ergy conservation programs for fiscal year 81 totalled $558 million.73
That figure reflects President Reagan's March 1981 rescissions and de-
ferrals.74 In Fiscal Year 1982, the Reagan administration proposed a
substantial curtailment in the budget for energy conservation pro-
grams. The Administration sought $195 million for conservation pro-
grams in Fiscal Year 1982, but Congress appropriated $143 million.7 5
Adding the Fiscal Year 1982, appropriation to the $241 million of Fis-
cal Year 1981 deferrals created a $384 million fund for energy conser-
vation programs.76 The $143 million in new appropriations represents
a seventy-fiye percent cut from the $558 million Fiscal Year 1981
figure. For Fiscal Year 1983, President Reagan has sought $22 million
for energy conservation programs.77
71. Id. at 40.
72. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, BUDGET IN BRIEF 1981, 5 (1980).
73. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 44, at 5-6.
74. S. AMDUR, A SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MARCH 10 BUDGET PROPOSAL, 2 (1981).
75. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 44 at 6. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL ENERGY
PROGRAMS FY83, BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 18, 32 (1982).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Energy Extension Service
The National Energy Extension Service Act78 was enacted in 1977.
The Energy Extension Service (EES) program is designed to make
available to small-scale energy users practical energy conservation op-
portunities. The program emphasized personalized services tailored to
a particular target audience within a state. Thus, Congress intended to
provide the targetted audience, small-scale energy users, with technical
assistance and information on energy matters.
The energy conservation budget lists the EES, in the state and local
grants section. In Fiscal Year 1981, $336 million was available for state
and local grants.7 9 In Fiscal Year 1982, state and local grants were
funded at $232 million, of which $178 million constituted a Fiscal Year
1981 deferral.8" Funding for state and local energy conservation grants
has decreased by thirty-one percent from Fiscal Year 1981 to Fiscal
Year 1982. The Reagan administration has requested no funds for the
EES program in Fiscal Year 1983.
Funding for Indiana's EES program has steadily decreased since
1980. Over a one year period Indiana received a $591,800 grant.81 The
State contributed no funds of its own for the support of the program.
In the following year DOE awarded Indiana a $395,200 grant. 2 Again
no State funds supplemented the federal funds. For the current year,
Indiana accepted a $198,200 grant from the federal government. As
now mandated by law, the State must match twenty percent of the
grant from the federal government.8 3 This State match of federal funds
constitutes the first time Indiana has become financially involved in the
EES program.
From May 1980 to April 1982, Indiana's EES underwent approxi-
mately a thirty-three percent reduction in funding. If the period from
May 1980 to April 1983 is considered, the cuts amount to approxi-
mately sixty percent. These funding reductions have had an impact on
Indiana's EES. The Division of Energy Policy continues to fund all the
component programs of the EES,84but does so at drastically reduced
levels. Since the EES is primarily an outreach program, quantifying
the meaning of these reduced funding levels is difficult. However, sev-
eral assertions can be made. First, the Division of Energy Policy has
not made a deliberate decision to discontinue any service; rather, the
78. Energy Research Act, Pub. L. No. 95-39, 91 Stat. 191 (1977).
79. All Fiscal Year 1981 budget figures reflect the rescissions and deferrals proposed by Presi-
dent Reagan and enacted by Congress. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 44, at 53.
80. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 75, at 32.
81. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NOTICE OF GRANT AWARD, (1980). This award ran from May 21,
1980 to May 21, 1981.
82. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NOTICE OF GRANT AWARD, This award ran from April 20, 1981 to
April 20, 1982.
83. R. HEDDING, Energy Extension Service 1 (1982).
84. Indiana's EES includes four different programs: the Small Retail Business Program, the
Indiana Energy Information Center, the Rural Energy Conservation Program, and the Ur-
ban Energy Conservation Program. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 82.
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outreach activities such as energy audits, educational programs, and
seminars will operate on a "first come - first serve" basis, until the
funds for a particular program are depleted." Second, the budget cuts
may lead to an emphasis on cheaper services such as seminars and
pamphlets rather than energy audits.86 Finally, to the extent that mass
media outreach is used, the EES becomes less effective in decreasing
energy consumption. Comprehensive site-specific conservation infor-
mation, provided in a personalized matter produces the greatest energy
savings." The federal budget cuts are likely to have an impact on Indi-
ana's EES.
As Indiana's EES decreases its level of services, two questions arise.
First, will private industry involve itself in outreach activities and
thereby reduce the impact of the federal budget cuts? To a great extent,
local gas and electric companies already offer energy conservation
materials, and most utility companies will offer energy audits when
contacted by a consumer, although generally the utility company
charges a fee for such services, and consumers may be unwilling to pay
such a fee. Second, how does a lack of energy extension services affect
the energy consumer? Since Indiana's EES is designed to be consumer-
motivated, actual use of the program may be minimal unless the con-
sumer is energy conservation oriented. Additionally, much of the in-
formation offered by the EES is available elsewhere.
State Energy Conservation Plan
The State Energy Conservation Plan Base and the State Energy
Conservation Plan Supplemental form the State Energy Conservation
Plan (SECP). The SECP program was enacted to promote energy con-
servation and reduce energy consumption in the public and private sec-
tors.88 The base program of the SECP, established by the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act 9 offers federal financial assistance to
states developing and implementing a comprehensive state energy con-
servation plan that reduces the 1980 state projected energy consump-
tion by at least five percent.90 The plan must include mandatory
lighting stahdards for public buildings, mandatory thermal efficiency
standards and insulation requirements for new and renovated build-
ings, a traffic law permitting a right turn on red, mandatory energy
efficiency standards and policies for state government procurement
practices, and promotional programs for car pools, van pools, and pub-
lic transportation. 9'
85. See "CoNCLUSION," infra p. 579.
86. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CONSERVATION OUTREACH AcTIvi-
TIES-A NEW FEDERAL APPROACH NEEDED 12 (1981).
87. Id at 5.
88. 42 U.S.C. §6321 (Supp. I 1978).
89. National Energy Conservation Policy Act. Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3239 (1978).
90. 42 U.S.C. §6322(a)(1) (1976).
91. 42 U.S.C. §6322(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
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The SECP supplemental program was created by the Energy Con-
servation and Production Act92 and offers further financial assistance to
the states for energy conservation. Each supplemental plan must in-
clude provisions for three programs. First, the plan must contain pro-
visions to implement a public education program for increasing public
awareness of the energy and cost savings from conservation and renew-
able resource technologies. Second, the plan must ensure the effective
coordination of local, state, and federal energy conservation programs.
Third, the plan must promote and provide energy audits for buildings
and industrial plants within the state.93
As mentioned previously, the state and local grants for energy con-
servation programs suffered a thirty-one percent reduction from Fiscal
Year 1981 to Fiscal Year 1982. The SECP program has undergone a
fifty percent reduction. In Fiscal Year 1980 and Fiscal Year 1981, the
program was funded at $47.8 million.94 The Reagan administration
sought to terminate funding for the SECP program, but Congress ap-
propriated $24.0 million to the program for Fiscal Year 1982.91
Indiana receives funding for its SECP under both the SECP base9 6
and supplemental programs.97 From Fiscal Year 1981 to Fiscal Year
1982, grants awarded to Indiana under the SECP base program de-
creased by twenty-five percent from $1,000,100 in Fiscal Year 1981 to
$754,800 in Fiscal Year 1982.98 The decrease in funding under the
SECP supplemental program from Fiscal Year 1981 to Fiscal Year
1982 is negligible. In Fiscal Year 1981, Indiana received $226,400 in
SECP supplemental grants monies, 99 and in Fiscal Year 1982, the State
was awarded a $211,000 grant."°° No state funds supplement the fed-
eral funds.
The federal budget cuts have resulted in the following service cuts:
no specific funding for the implementation, monitoring or updating of
current thermal and lighting efficiency standards; second, the industrial
program now operates at less than half of its former capacity, and
finally, the emergency energy plan receives no funding for redrafting or
reconsideration in Fiscal Year 1982.
92. Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat. 1125 (1976).
93. 42 U.S.C. §6327(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
94. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATE ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAM NEEDS REAS-
SESSING 4 (1982).
95. Id.
96. Under the SECP base program, Indiana receives money for lighting and thermal efficiency
standards, an energy information library, promotional materials for carpools and van pools,
energy conservation models for industrial settings, and energy-conscious government pro-
curement practices.
97. Under the SECP supplemental program, Indiana finances three programs: an energy curric-
ulum for kindergarten through high school students; energy audits for residential, industrial,
and commercial buildings; energy planning for local governments.
98. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra notes 81 and 82.
99. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NOTICE OF GRANT AWARD, SUPPLEMENTAL STATE ENERGY CON-
SERVATION PLAN, (1980).
100. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 82.
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Interestingly, despite the budget cuts some programs have received
more funding. Both the energy audit programs for residential and in-
dustrial consumers were awarded more money in the Fiscal Year 1982
grant than the Fiscal Year 1981, and new money was made available
for intergovernmental programs.
These funding changes have had several results: the increase in the
energy audits program has produced more audits, and since these au-
dits are generally personalized and site-specific, energy savings are
likely to occur. The decrease in funding for the industrial program has
curtailed promotion of energy conservation in industrial settings. The
cessation of funding for lighting and thermal efficiency standards could
effectively halt enforcement of those standards. Overall, the decrease
in funding has stunted program creativity. Indiana is relying on energy
conservation measures which have been tried and tested rather than
trying to develop new methods for energy conservation.
It is unlikely that Indiana will commit funds to the SECP while
federal dollars are continuing to come to the State. Local government
financial involvement is also highly unlikely because of other priorities,
but local governments can adopt a variety of low-cost conservation
measures like energy efficient building codes, restrictions on building
temperatures, and energy conscious government procurement practices
which will reduce the State's energy usage. Private industry may in-
volve itself in the SECP by promoting certain products as energy effi-
cient and by offering special financing for energy conservation
measures. However private industry involvement will occur only if
business will profit fr6m such a venture. Probably only the consumer's
interest in energy conservation measures will entice a firm to actively
promote and push its product as an energy saver.
The impact of the federal budget cuts on the Indiana energy con-
sumer is probably quite small. The majority of Indiana's SECP re-
volves around promotional or educational material. Since the mere
receipt of such information may not lead to the employment of energy
conservation devices, the consumer may not reap any energy savings
from it. Presently, the effect of reduced SECP service levels on the en-
ergy consumer is minimal.
Schools and Hospital Program
The National Energy Conservation Policy Act' 01 created a fifty per-
cent matching grant program to aid schools and hospitals in decreasing
energy consumption. The Schools and Hospitals Energy Conservation
Program operates in two phases. In Phase I, the Department of Energy
provides money for the development of a state plan for energy conser-
vation for schools and hospitals.' Also during Phase I, individual
101. National Energy Conservation Policy Act, supra note 89.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 6371(c) (Supp. I 1978).
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buildings receive detailed energy audits designed to identify mainte-
nance and operational changes which have no significant costs and can
reduce energy use by fifteen to thirty percent.10 3 During Phase II, DOE
offers financial assistance for the design, purchase, and installation of
specific energy conservation measures that can produce an additional
fifteen percent of energy savings. 104
Schools and hospitals submit their grant requests for energy conser-
vation measures and technical assistance to the state, which then ranks
the applications according to potential energy savings, and these
ranked requests are sent to DOE regional offices for final approval.
Federal funding of fifty percent must be matched with non-federal
money by the institution. The Carter Administration requested $203
million for the Schools and Hospitals program in Fiscal Year 1981, but
the Reagan Administration's rescissions and deferrals reduced the ap-
propriation to $81.3 million.105 One hundred million dollars was re-
quested for the program in Fiscal Year 1982; approximately that
amount was appropriated, and no funding has been sought for the pro-
gram for Fiscal Year 1983.1°
The State of Indiana uses federal money awarded under the
Schools and Hospital Program for administrative and management ex-
penses. Indiana received $107,774 under the Schools & Hospitals Pro-
gram for the budget period beginning April 1979 and ending
September 1981,107 a continuation grant of $98,000 for use from Octo-
ber 1980 to September 1981,108 and a supplemental grant of $95,443 for
the budget period beginning September 1981 and ending September
1982.109 For the entire budget period running from 1979 through 1982,
DOE allocated $301,217 to Indiana, which the State has matched.110
Thus, a total of $602,440 has been available for administrative expenses
arising from the Schools and Hospitals Program grants during the
1979-1982 budget period.
The DOE has funnelled$44A-million in grants for Fiscal Year 1981
and $1.1 million in Fiscal Year 1982 to schools and hospitals in Indi-
ana."' The DOE does not distribute funds through the state office.
Rather, when the DOE regional office approves a school or hospital
request the grant monies issue directly to that approved school or hos-
pital from the regional office.
Schools and hospitals in St. Joseph County and South Bend have
received grant monies from the state and the Department of Energy
103. 42 U.S.C. § 6371(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 6371(e) (Supp. 11 1978).
105. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 44, at 53.
106. L. PARKER, R. BOMBERGER & S. ABBAS, THE UNFOLDING OF THE REAGAN ENERGY PRO-
GRAM: THE FIRST YEAR 41 (1981).
107. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NOTICE OF GRANT AWARD, (1980).
108. Id.
109. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 107.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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since 1978. For Fiscal Year 1981, local schools and hospitals received
$314,234 through the Schools and Hospitals Program. The applicants
matched that money with $314,236 of their own funds.' 12 In Fiscal
Year 1982, both the number and size of the grants dropped. St. Joseph
County and South Bend schools and hospitals were awarded $182,052
which the applicants matched with $246,159.1 13
In Fiscal Year 1981, St. Joseph County and South Bend hospitals
and schools received less than eight percent of the $4.1 million avail-
able for grants. Although the grant money available for Fiscal Year
1982 had decreased to $1.1 million, the schools and hospitals in St. Jo-
seph County were awarded sixteen percent of the funds.
The amount of grant money available to Indiana schools and hospi-
tals for energy conservation measures has been drastically reduced
since Fiscal Year 1981. Grant applicants are now competing for fewer
resources. Despite the decreasing amount of grant monies, the South
Bend area is receiving greater proportionate funding under the smaller
Fiscal Year 1982 levels than the Fiscal Year 1981 levels. However, the
total dollar amounts that St. Joseph County schools and hospitals were
awarded in Fiscal Year 1982 is less than the amounts they were
awarded in Fiscal Year 1981. These smaller dollar amounts result
from two factors. First, the budget cuts decreased the money available
for grant awards so less money was available for distribution. Second,
the economy was suffering from high interest rates and scarce money
supply. Some schools and hospitals in the St. Joseph County area may
not be able to afford the financing and capital necessay to meet the fifty
percent matching requirement.
The Schools and Hospitals Program was originally justified on two
bases. Schools and hospitals generally do not pay taxes so they are
unable to avail themselves of energy conservation tax credits. In other
words, they cannot "write off" their investment. Additionally, schools
and hospitals rely on current operating expenses and are, therefore, un-
able to undertake projects extending beyond their current budget pe-
riod. These facts highlight the impact decreased Federal support for
the program can have. If a school cannot obtain funding for energy
conservation measures, energy costs will consume a greater portion of
the school's budget resulting in cuts in educational programs and po-
tential increases in taxes. If hospitals cannot obtain partial government
funding for energy conservation measures, fees will increase to finance
the soaring energy costs. Increased medical costs will, in turn, impact
on Indiana's health care programs, particularly Medicaid. School chil-
dren, taxpayers, and medical care recipients can all be harmed by fund-
ing reductions in the Schools and Hospitals Program. These problems
have not yet manifested themselves, however.
112. Sue Whitaker, Division of Energy Policy, Indiana Department of Commerce, Interview, Oc-
tober 25, 1982.
113. Id.
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It is unlikely that Indiana, South Bend, or private industry will step
in to aid the Schools and Hospitals Program. As long as Indiana
schools and hospitals are receiving some funding under the program,
the State will not supplement the federal program. Local governments,
such as South Bend, cannot afford to step in because the program is so
expensive. Private industry is highly unlikely to take up the federal
government's share of the program, again because of its cost. Private
industry may be willing to partially finance energy conservation meas-
ures if such actions can be treated as tax deductible gifts to charities.
Private industry may also arrange for special financing for energy con-
servation measures in order to sell their product.
Even without the Schools and Hospitals Program, many institutions
will react to rising energy costs. Schools and hospitals will adopt en-
ergy conservation measures motivated solely by potential energy sav-
ings. Nevertheless, the Schools and Hospitals Program might induce
an institution to adopt the measure at an earlier time, thereby saving
more energy. Additionally, if the measure is financed solely by institu-
tion funds, hospital rates, and perhaps taxes may increase at a greater
rate than if the measure is financed by the institution and the govern-
ment. Decreased funding for the Schools and Hospitals Program can
wreak havoc with budgets and operations of schools and hospitals.
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
Off Shale
Indiana's resource development branch of the Division of Energy
Policy coordinates oil shale, one of Indiana richest energy resources.' 14
This division fosters efficient energy use and incentives for private in-
dustry to develop Indiana's indigenous energy resources. Though Indi-
ana did not receive any comprehensive federal funding for oil shale
development, state funds were combined with a federal grant to finance
a study which will determine the extent and location of economically
recoverable oil shale. 1 5 This effort sparked some private interest, but
the Administration's decision to cut federal support for oil shale
projects places development in a high risk category and deters private
initiatives.
The Reagan Administration has chosen to encourage oil shale de-
velopment by decontrolling conventional fuel prices, revitalizating the
economy, and removing regulatory uncertainties." 6 In July 1981, the
Administration stated that it would reduce funding for oil shale
projects because private corporate planning activities had intensified;" 7
however, Exxon's abandonment of an unfinished Colorado synfuels
114. LARASON, supra note 45, at 12.
115. IRWIN, OIL SHALE PROSPECT OF THE NEW ALBANY SHALE (1982).
116. Supra, note 5.
117. Supra, note 5.
[Vol. 10:560
Energy Policy
project in April 1982 illustrates the tenuous nature of private invest-
ment in oil shale development.
Oil shale could make a significant contribution to Indiana's energy
supply; some estimates state that Indiana's oil shale reserves, used in
conjunction with other energy resources, could last for several hundred
years."' Without Federal support, however, Indiana's troubled econ-
omy may not be able to muster the requisite capital for several years.
Given the likelihood of increasing energy costs, which to Indiana
means increasing state revenue losses, Indiana cannot afford to wait.
South Bend Ethanol Plant
In 1980, Congress enacted the Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels
Act. " 9 Under this Act, a project can receive financial assistance in the
forms of insured loans, loan guarantees, and price guarantees. 120 Con-
gress conditioned financial asistance on showing that the project could
not obtain credit elsewhere without the assistance offered by the Act.
In fiscal year 80, the Departments of Energy and Agriculture received
$745 million and $525 million, respectively, to provide financial assist-
ance to alcohol fuels projects. 12 1 This appropriation was made on a
multi-year basis so no additional funds were granted in Fiscal Year
1981.
When President Reagan took office in 1981, funding for alcohol fu-
els projects changed dramatically. The Administration viewed alcohol
fuels as a technologically proven energy resource no longer needing
government subsidies. Direct federal spending on alcohol fuels will de-
crease through 1986 because the Administration contends that market
forces and private investment initiatives will spur the development of
renewable resources such as alcohol fuels.' 22
In Fiscal Year 1982, President Reagan sought to terminate the Al-
cohol Fuels and Biomass program, and in addition, to rescind the un-
obligated balances of the Fiscal Year 1981 appropriated funds. Under
this proposal, the Department of Energy would have lost $741 million
and the Department of Agriculture $505 million.'23 The Fiscal Year
1981 funds were not rescinded, but Congress appropriated no addi-
tional money to the program for Fiscal Year 1982, and the Fiscal Year
1983 budget requests $3 million for an orderly phase-out of alcohol
fuels research and development activities. 24
Although funding for the alcohol fuels program has been curtailed,
the program does receive certain other federal subsidies. The sale of
118. LARASON, supra note 45.
119. Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 683 (1980).
120. 42 U.S.C.A. §8813-8815 (Supp. I 1978).
121. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON BUDGET SAVINGS FY82
BUDGET REVIEWS 109.
122. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 43, at 9.
123. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 121, at 109.
124. Id.
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gasoline containing at least ten percent ethanol is exempt from the four
cents per gallon federal excise tax on motor fuels. 2 ' This exemption
expires in October 1992.126 Additidnally, Section 44(E) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides a forty cents per gallon alternative income tax
credit for alcohol used as fuel. 27 The Internal Revenue Code, Section
46, also provides a ten percent investment credit for property or bio-
mass property. 128 In January 1982, President Reagan proposed repeals
of both these credits and the exemptions. Elimination of the exemp-
tions and credits for alcohol fuels would yield $431 million to the
Treasury in Fiscal Year 1982.129 Reagan's proposals would leave alco-
hol fuels programs with only minimal government support. 130 Con-
gress has yet to act on these proposed repeals.
The financing of the construction and initial operation of the South
Bend ethanol plant is a unique mixture of federal, local, and private
money. The project cost totals approximately $191 million of which
$180 million constitutes plant development and $11 million public
costs. A loan guarantee, an Urban Development Action Grant
(UDAG), and limited and general partners' capital contributions have
been combined to finance the $180 million in plant development costs.
New Energy Corporation of Indiana, the original developer of the
plant, first acquired a $1,769,000 grant from DOE.' 3 ' The grant was
used for site studies, pre-construction planning, and regulatory compli-
ance, and must be repaid once the plant has started commercial opera-
tion. To finance the actual construction of the plant, New Energy
Company of Indiana, the limited partnership operating the plant, ob-
tained a $140,914,000 loan.'32 The United States government through
the Department of Energy has guaranteed repayment of ninety percent
of the principal and interest of the loan.
The City of South Bend was awarded an Urban Development Ac-
tion Grant by the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
totaling $9.9 million, of which $4.9 million constitutes a loan payable to
the government by New Energy Company of Indiana. The city will
advance approximately $2.6 million to New Energy Company for plant
site preparation work,'33 and will use another $2.3 million to relocate
utility transmission lines on the plant site, extend city sewage, storm
sewer, and water lines to the plant, and construct an access road to the
plant from the nearest state highway. The remaining $5 million will be
awarded to the South Bend Development Corporation (SBDC), an In-
125. I.R.C. §4081(c) (1976).
126. I.R.C. §4081(c)(4) (1976).
127. I.R.C. §44E (1976).
128. I.R.C. §46(a)(2)(c).
129. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 121, at 110.
130. Id.
131. FIRST BOSTON CORPORATION & E.F. HUTTON & COMPANY, PROSPECTUS FOR NEW EN-
ERGY COMPANY OF INDIANA 25 (1982).
132. Id at 23.
133. Id at 25.
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diana non-profit local development corporation, which will buy a $5
million special limited partnership interest in the New Energy
Company. 134
Capital contributions from the general and limited partners of New
Energy Company will finance the plant's remaining construction costs.
New Energy Corporation, as general partner of New Energy Company
of Indiana, contributed $3 million in equity capital. The bank loan and
the loan guarantee were conditioned on New Energy Company raising
an additional $37 million of equity.135 The company, offered for public
sale $37 million in limited partnership interests in $5,000 increments.
E.F. Hutton & Company and First Boston Corporation agreed to sub-
scribe for $32 million of limited partnership interests, 136 which added
to the $3 million general partnership contribution and the $5 million
SBDC special limited partnership interest, constitute the $40 million in
equity capital required by the banks and DOE.
Through various mixes of private and public funding, the partner-
ship has raised $185,636,000 for the construction and operation of
plant, but throughout the early stages of planning the various funding
arrangements existed very tenuously. The banks conditioned their loan
on the execution of a loan guarantee agreement by the U.S. Govern-
ment, and on the existence of $40 million in equity capital. The loan
guarantee also depended on the partnership's raising $40 million in eq-
uity capital, and accumulating that hinged on the $5 million special
limited partnership interest being purchased by SBDC. This special
limited partnership interest in turn, depended on the $10 million
UDAG being awarded to South Bend. Additionally, the $2.6 million
advanced to the partnership for site preparation work by South Bend
depended on the UDAG. These various conditions suggest that fund-
ing such an enterprise through private and public investment is a risky
business, and further suggests that the South Bend ethanol plant would
never have materialized without active government support. Private
industry is unwilling to finance alcohol fuels technologies without some
federal government guarantees.
CONCLUSION
When President Reagan took office, he sought to reduce the size of
government and to minimize the Federal government's influence in the
private sector by exercising tighter fiscal policies and eliminating ineffi-
cient programs and programs which the private sector can adequately
manage. No reasonable individual could disagree with these goals.
But, somewhere between conceptualization and actualization, these
laudable objectives dispersed into a millieu of contradictory initiatives
134. Second Supplement to Prospectus Dated April 28, 1982, August 25, 1982, at 1.
135. FIRST BOSTON, supra note 131, at 4.
136. Second Supplement to Prospectus, supra note 136, at 1.
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and results. Federal energy policy and programs, areas where Presi-
dent Reagan specifically sought to illustrate the benefits of minimizing
federal support, demonstrate the misfortunes which result from the im-
proper application of reasonable principles.
An examination of the federal energy budget indicates that the Ad-
ministration has not consistently applied its objectives. Between Fiscal
Year 1981 and Fiscal Year 1983, funding for all federal energy pro-
grams except nuclear power has been drastically reduced, solar by
ninety percent and conservation by ninety-seven percent. These budget
cuts dismiss the proven benefits and cost-effectiveness of many of these
programs and ignore the likelihood that neither state governments nor
private ventures have the resources to maintain such programs.
The Administration decided to reduce conservation and renewable
resource programs because it believed that free market forces would
better foster these energy alternatives. Ironically, the Administration's
free market orientation disregards the signals of the market place, in-
creasing funding for the fading nuclear industry while slashing support
for high growth renewable resource technologies. 37 Energy supplies
the lifeblood of our economy and fulfills essential human needs. While
the market place may best solve immediate energy problems, supplying
energy for the future requires consistent and comprehensive planning.
Higher energy prices have spurred consumers to conserve and arguably
supplant the need for federally-funded conservation programs. How-
ever, the market place does not provide the optimum forum for decid-
ing long-term energy questions.
Currently, the United States and world economies heavily depend
on fossil fuels, a finite and environmentally hazardous resource. The
transition to clean, renewable resources is inevitable; the crucial issue is
whether private industry or the federal government provides the most
efficient vehicle for fostering this transition.
Private industry decisions focus on gaining short-term payoffs and
are dictated by the profit motive. This orientation minimizes corporate
incentives to invest in long-term projects which do not guarantee a
commensurate payoff. In contrast, the federal government is the only
structure which has the capacity to properly address essential national
needs. State and local governments lack the authority and financial
resources to solve energy problems from a national perspective. The
federal government not only has the responsibility to confront funda-
mental concerns such as energy, it has the duty to do so. By ignoring
this duty, the likelihood of a tumultuous transition causing unnecessary
human suffering and economic havoc dramatically increases.
The Administration views energy development as part of its Eco-
nomic Recovery Program:
When fully implemented, the Economic Recovery Program will release
137. Flavin, U.S. Losing Sunshine Race, Chicago Trib., Jan. 1, 1983, at 9.
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the strength of the private sector and insure a vigorous economic cli-
mate in which the Nation's problems, including energy problems, will
be solved primarily by the American people themselves. . .
By making this correlation, the Administration acknowledges the sig-
nificant relationship between energy and economic recovery. But, an
economic recovery program which fails to support growth industries
during critical formative periods will hinder rather than release the
strength of the private sector.
State and local governments play a vital role in stimulating eco-
nomic recovery; however, their impact on energy development remains
largely dependent on federal initiatives. Fiscal pressures force state
and local governments to prioritize the allocation of available revenues.
Housing, mass transit, roads, and Medicaid are traditional responsibili-
ties for state and local governments. Given these responsibilities, en-
ergy programs will probably not receive state and local support unless
these other programs are secure.
Despite the millions of dollars eliminated from the federal energy
budget during the Fiscal Year 1981 to Fiscal Year 1982 period, Indi-
ana's Division of Energy Policy will be able to offer nearly the same
level of services and programs until the autumn of 1983. At that time,
the Division of Energy Policy will be forced to scale back their opera-
tions. The Division has proposed the following adjustments if federal
funds are not reinstated. First, the Division's staff will be reduced from
twenty-two to fifteen. Second, the Auditing Program of the SECP will
be eliminated. Third, the Energy Efficient Transportation Program of
the SECP will be transferred to the Indiana Department of Transporta-
tion. Fourth, the Government Procurements Program of the SECP will
be moved to the Department of Administration. Fifth, the Schools and
Hospitals Program will not continue. And sixth, the EES and the
SECP will continue on rollover funds.
During the past ten years, the United States has experienced great
fluctuations in federal attitudes toward energy policy. Amid these fluc-
tuations, waste and inefficiency occurred. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and
Carter may have overreacted to the oil embargoes of the 1970's by
funding programs which did not prove cost-effective. But, their efforts
did raise the nation's consciousness concerning the importance of con-
fronting energy issues, a volatile feature of our economy. Their initia-
tives stirred significant scientific research and centralized creative
energy efforts. When President Reagan took office, he labelled DOE as
an illustration of unnecessary government intervention. He attempted
to dismantle DOE and succeeded in scaling down many significant
programs. This process resulted in reorganizational costs and reversed
prior government efforts to address energy issues.
Attitudes and strategies concerning energy issues continue to be de-
138. Supra note 49, at 2.
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bated and important problems remain. One clear lesson emerges from
the last ten years of energy policy efforts: government per se is not the
problem; problems result when governments act irresponsibly, inef-
ficiently, and negligently. Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration's
efforts have created significant long-term energy uncertainties that can-
not be resolved by fragmented efforts by the federal government, state
and local governments and the private sector.
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